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Abstract 
This essay offers a critical reexamination of the works of Friedrich List by placing them in the context of 
nineteenth-century imperial economies. I argue that List's theory of the national economy is characterised by a 
major ambivalence, as it incorporates both imperial and anti-imperial elements. On the one hand, List pitted his 
national principle against the British imperialism of free trade and the relations of dependency it heralded for 
late developers like Germany. On the other hand, his economic nationalism aimed less at dismantling imperial 
core–periphery relations as a whole than at reproducing these relations domestically and expanding them 
globally. I explain this ambivalence with reference to List's designation of imperial Britain as the prime example 
of successful economic development and a model to be emulated by late industrialisers. List thereby fashioned 
his ideas on national development out of the historical experience of an empire whereby he internalised its 
economic logic and discourse of the civilising mission. Consequently, List's national economy culminated in an 
early vision of the global north–south relations, in which the global industrial-financial core would expand to 
include France, Germany and the USA, while the rest of the world would be reduced to quasi-colonial agrarian 
hinterlands. 
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The peculiar place of Friedrich List in the history of political economy is relatively undisputed. While twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries' interpretations of List differ on the choice of labels in categorising his theory, there 
exists a broad agreement that it is animated by the historical problem of late development (Gerschenkron 
1962), which it addresses through strategies of state-led industrialisation that are equidistant to liberal and 
socialist alternatives alike (Szporluk 1988).1 For scholars of comparative economic development, List's historical 
and contemporary relevance is rooted in his trenchant critique of asymmetric free trade (Chang 2003 Wade 
2003, 2006), his emphasis on technological innovation (Freeman 1995) and his articulation of a distinct strain of 
‘nonliberal capitalism’ (Streeck and Yamamura 2005). Viewed from a global perspective, the same arguments 
have been dubbed ‘neomercantilism’ (Gilpin 1987, Kirshner 1999, Nederveen Pietersee 2001), a theme that has 
gained salience with the emerging economies’ record of interventionism and state-owned enterprises.2 
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The aim of this essay is to reconsider List's political economy from an unorthodox point of view; ‘unorthodox’ 
because the extant scholarship on List's economic nationalism often treats it in an international relations 
framework (Levi-Faur 1997a 1997b, Harlen 1999, Helleiner, E. 2002), whereas the analysis presented here is 
squarely anchored in the framework of imperial economy. I argue that the key to understand List's seminal 
theory of the national economy resides, paradoxically, not in a stylised international system of nation-states but 
in the uneven global terrain of colonial empires. List wrote in a world made by the ‘first age of global 
imperialism’ (Bayly 1998), which rendered the socioeconomic relations that he analysed fundamentally imperial 
in nature. I contend that recasting List's ‘national economy’ in imperial light pierces the boundaries between the 
nation, empire and free trade that we habitually read into nineteenth-century political economy. The arguments 
of this paper therefore hope to incite critical rethinking on economic development, state-building and 
international relations. 
 
At the centre of my analysis is the ambivalence of List's notion of the national economy, which I argue 
incorporates both anti-imperial and imperial elements. On the one hand, List's economic nationalism staged a 
critical response to what has been labelled Britain's ‘imperialism of free trade’ (Gallagher and Robinson 1953, 
Semmel 1970, 1993). On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, List's theory aimed less at dismantling 
the historical relations of ‘colonial capitalism’ embodied by the British Empire than at reproducing these 
relations nationally and expanding them globally so as to include late-industrialising nations like Germany and 
France in the industrial-financial core of the global economy. To unravel this ambivalence without indicting List 
of cynicism, I draw attention to Britain's distinctly imperial division of labour that constituted the historical 
referent from which List abstracted the theoretical tenets and policy prescriptions for his national economy. 
Despite his fervent declamations against British free trade policy, List consistently heaped praise upon Britain's 
industrial strategy and held it up as a model to emulate for building a national economy. The British economy, 
however, was by the second quarter of the nineteenth century a globe-spanning imperial economy, comprising 
an industrial-financial metropole and agrarian colonial peripheries forced to specialise in the production of 
primary products. By fashioning his theory of autonomous economic development out of the historical 
experience of a colonial empire, List in effect inscribed imperial core–periphery relations of dependency in the 
very concept of the national economy. If, as recent commentators (Roussakis 1968, Henderson 1983, Levi-Faur 
1997b, Winch 1998) have suggested, List was a visionary of a liberal international world order based on 
economic reciprocity between independent and equal states, then this vision was braided with profound 
economic and political asymmetries since its inception. 
 
The essay proceeds in two sections. The first section offers a brief overview of various intellectual influences on 
List's theory before reconstructing his critique of classical political economy as the ideological handmaiden of 
the British imperialism of free trade. I survey List's reflections on ‘productive powers,’ economic interventionism 
and infant industries, which undergird his contemporary image as the intellectual paragon of national 
developmentalism. The second section readjusts our analytic lenses to detect the inherently imperial 
parameters of List's political economy. I claim that the anti-imperial potential of List's theory was compromised 
by his adoption of the imperial features of the British economy as a developmental blueprint, complete with an 
imperial discourse of civilisation and savagery. By examining List's fears of a continental Europe reduced to 
quasi-colonial status under British hegemony, I demonstrate that List conceived of Britain's economic 
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relationship to Germany, France and the USA in imperial rather than international terms. This led List to infuse 
the very definition of a ‘normal nation’ with an imperial content and thereby ‘imperialise’ the nation. Instead of 
gesturing at economic independence for European and non-European peoples alike, List's proposals culminated 
in an early vision of the Global North as the exclusive locus of techno-industrial progress and the protagonist of a 
civilising mission draped in the internationalist garbs of a ‘world trade congress'. 
 
I conclude that an imperial perspective on List's political economy compels us to think of the ‘colonial empire’ as 
much as a socioeconomic template for the nation-state as a politico-legal framework that was eclipsed by it. 
Economic nationalism as an institutional–ideological complex emerged from distinctly transnational and 
imperial contexts (Goswami 2004, Todd 2015). In order to grasp the historical origins of the national economy, 
therefore, we need to move beyond the nation-state as the principal unit of economic analysis. 
 
1. Late development, economic liberalism and imperialism of free trade 
 
1.1. Problem of late development and the critique of ‘cosmopolitan economy’ 
 
It should be noted at the outset that List was not a professional scholar of political economy but a publicist 
whose self-proclaimed goal was to influence the economic policies of what he called ‘second- and third-rate 
industrialised nations’ like the USA, Germany, France and Russia in their endeavour to catch up with Britain 
(Henderson 1983). After a brief and lacklustre academic career at the University of Tübingen, List agitated for 
administrative reform in Württemberg, which earned him a prison sentence. Opting for exile, List travelled 
widely in continental Europe and spent considerable time in the USA, and his sojourns in these late-developing 
countries proved formative for his political-economic thinking.3 While List declared himself to be ‘cosmopolitan 
by principle,’ his position on free trade was at best ambivalent before he relocated to the USA in 1825. In the 
USA, List found inspiration in Alexander Hamilton and Daniel Raymond's advocacy of protectionism and 
addressed his Outlines of American Political Economy (1827) to Northeastern industrial interests (Notz 1926, 
Earle 1986, Tribe 1988, 1995). List's long-standing admiration of French protectionists like Louis Say, Antoine 
Chaptal, Adolphe Thiers and Charles Dupin came to its own when he penned ‘The Natural System of Political 
Economy’ (1837) as a contender for a prize offered by the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences 
(Henderson 1989a). In addition to these immediate influences, the Russian effort at late development indirectly 
found its way into List's theory through the writings of German-Russian economist Heinrich von Storch 
(Zweynert 2004, Adamovsky 2010). These theoretical threads readily resonated with the German economic 
tradition to which List belonged, with its characteristically productionist bias, scepticism of abstract theories and 
inductive approach to specific experiences of economic development (Reinert 2005). List's engagement with this 
heterodox theoretical heritage culminated in his magnum opus, The National System of Political Economy 
(1841). 
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What united these diverse experiences and the economic ideas they spawned at the turn of the century was 
their ‘provincial’ status in a global economy increasingly dominated by the British Empire, whose policymakers 
openly propagated theories of comparative advantage and free trade. As Rothschild (2004: 6) notes, 
provincialism was a ‘source of extraordinary creativity’ that gave provincial thinkers like List a ‘willingness to 
question the established wisdom of an imperial or metropolitan world to which they were connected, but to 
which they did not belong'. List's theory of the national economy, with its twin pillars of ‘productive powers’ and 
‘infant industry protection', took root in these heterodox reflections on economic development. In France, the 
fervent debate that raged over economic policy in the 1830s generated many of the themes that structured 
List's economic thought, such as the notion of productive powers, the contrast between industrial autarky and 
industrial competition, and the spectre of deindustrialisation attendant to free trade policy (Todd 2015).4 
Similarly, List's sojourn in the USA proved momentous for the formation of a common theoretical position 
against British economics, whereby ‘economics in Germany and the USA strongly influenced and fertilised each 
other’ (Reinert 2005: 48). 
 
List substantiated his programme of the national economy in tandem with a three-pronged critique of the 
‘School of Universal Free Trade', which he attributed to the teachings of the Physiocrats, Adam Smith and Jean-
Baptiste Say. First, echoing Dupin's designation of classical economics as ‘anti-political economics’ (Todd 2015: 
143), List contended that the Smithian school subscribed to a naïve theory of ‘cosmopolitan economy’ centred 
on the dyadic relationship between the private economy of individual transactions and the global economy as a 
whole. Cosmopolitanism overlooked the historical fact that human beings had always been organised in 
bounded polities that imposed an ‘intermediate interest between those of individualism and of entire humanity’ 
(List 1909a: 129). Accordingly, List maintained that the adequate framework of economic analysis had to be 
national and international, as opposed to individual and global. In fairness to Smith, List's depiction of 
cosmopolitan economy was a partial misrepresentation. As Hont (2005) has compellingly shown, a central 
preoccupation for Smith and other classical political economist was the ‘jealousy of trade’ bred by the 
competitive ‘commercial reason of state'. In fact, as I explain below, List borrowed from classical political 
economy a key idea that the latter had devised to render commercial inter-state rivalry more peaceful, namely, 
the ‘emulation’ of successful economies by backward ones, which would have the effect of increasing prosperity 
and civilisation for all (Hont 2005: 111–25). Where List dramatically parted ways with Smith concerned the 
mechanisms by which universal peace and prosperity could be achieved. Smith located these mechanisms in 
expanding circles of global commerce that would eventually attenuate national antagonisms and equalise the 
economic fortunes of different peoples (Smith 1981, Pitts 2005, Muthu 2008, Hill 2010). At the time List wrote, 
Ricardians had vulgarised this optimistic premise into a blanket defense of free trade based on comparative 
advantage (Walther 1984). List countered this position with a focus on national economic policy without which, 
he argued, unhindered global commerce would entrench, rather than mitigate, economic inequalities between 
different countries. 
 
Secondly, List targeted the ‘dead materialism’ of Smith's labour theory of value against which he pitted his 
theory of ‘productive powers'. Smithian economics reduced wealth to its commodified form and labelled as 
unproductive those labouring activities that did not augment the stock of exchange value embodied in material 
things (List 1983: 37). This ‘mere shopkeeper's theory’ occluded from view the crucial ‘immaterial forces of 
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production’ that included knowledge, skill, education and political institutions that List subsumed under the 
category of ‘mental capital’ (List 1909a: 113; also see Blaug 1976). List was here extending the prior critiques of 
classical political economy developed by Chaptal, Louis Say and Storch.5 The latter had argued for a more 
capacious theory of value that took into account the social conditions of wealth creation that themselves could 
not be embodied or exchanged, which they variously called ‘utility', ‘personal capital’ or ‘internal goods’ 
(Henderson 1989a: 107, Zweynert 2004: 531–2, Adamovsky 2010: 366). For List, productivity of individual labour 
and industry rested on the political and legal constitution of societies, scientific learning and technological 
innovation, transportation and communication infrastructure, security of person and property and economic 
competition balanced by long-time horizons in investments. 
 
List not only deemed these conditions to be ‘infinitely more important that wealth itself’ (List 1909a: 106), but 
also, and crucially, conceived their establishment and maintenance as an essentially political project that had to 
be undertaken by the state (Winch 1998: 306). In one of the many commendatory references to British 
economic history, List found the sterling example of prioritising productive powers over exchange value in the 
eighteenth-century British policy of protecting the domestic textile industry from more competitive Indian 
imports. ‘The English ministers’ had thereby shown that they ‘cared not for the acquisition of low-priced and 
perishable articles of manufacture, but for that more costly but enduring manufacturing power’ (List 1909a: 59). 
On this last point, List diverged from Storch, who had an ambivalent position on industry and advocated an 
agrarian trajectory of economic development for Russia. By contrast, while List defended a balanced 
development of agricultural, commercial and industrial activities for an economy to be independent, he 
accorded industrial productive powers a privileged place. ‘Industry is the mother and father of all science, 
literature, the arts, enlightenment, freedom, useful institutions, national power and independence’ (List 1983: 
66). On this point, he was in agreement with both Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton who had noted the 
dynamism of manufacturing, especially the mass production of subsistence goods and its positive feedback 
loops with commerce and agriculture.6 Industry exponentially enhanced the national capacity to produce wealth 
and its nurturing required abandoning the classical doctrine of buying on the cheapest market. 
 
1.2. National economy versus imperialism of free trade 
 
Weaving these two premises together, List aimed his third and final critique at free trade orthodoxy and its 
growing popularity amongst the policymakers of continental Europe, exemplified by the warm welcome that the 
British economic emissary and lobbyist Dr Bowring received in Prussia in 1839 (Henderson 1989a). After the 
Napoleonic Wars,7 List observed, 
people all over the world fell under the spell of theoretical economists, who argued that the doctrine of 
free trade should now be put into practice. Governments appeared to be willing to listen to these 
arguments. Russia, Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the United States seemed to be 
ready to accept English manufactured goods in exchange for their own products (1983). 
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Adherence to free trade doctrine and policy, List lamented, exposed European economies to Britain's free trade 
imperialism. This was not a figment of List's paranoid imagination. As Gallagher and Robinson (1953: 9) have 
argued in a pioneering essay, the British strategy in this period was to convert colonial possessions into 
‘complementary satellite economies, which would provide raw materials and food for Great Britain, and also 
provide widening markets for its manufactures'.8 Bernard Semmel likewise notes that the strategy of combining 
industrial superiority with free trade found increasing appeal amongst British statesmen of the period, from 
Benjamin Disraeli to Robert Peel, who variously mentioned their country's ‘manufacturing and commercial pre-
eminence’ and its status as the ‘metropolis of the world’ (Semmel: 57, 72). The spirit was epitomised by 
Wakefield's call to British policymakers in his England and America published in 1833 (1968: 411): 
 
The whole world is before you. Open new channels for the most productive employment of English 
capital. Let the English buy bread from every people that has bread to sell cheap. Make England, for all 
that is produced by steam, the workshop of the world. (also see, Semmel 1971) 
 
Less openly stated but firmly implied in this vision was the deindustrialisation of the non-British world and its 
reduction to the status of agrarian hinterlands and export markets. Set against such open proclamations of 
British economic expansionism, a politically fragmented Germany with complacent policymakers and woefully 
inadequate tariffs on British imports profoundly alarmed List.9 Unfortunately for List, he remained a ‘lonely voice 
speaking out against the economic policy of liberalism and peripheral deindustrialization’ (Reinert 2005: 60), and 
his efforts to raise collective German tariffs on British goods bore no fruit in his lifetime. 
 
List might have been a lonely voice in the age of free trade sentiment, yet he did not regard his advocacy of 
protectionism as an anomaly or a throwback to an obsolete policy. In the National System, he made it clear that 
in advocating a ‘manufacturing system,’ he was ‘far from wishing … to revive the doctrine of the balance of trade 
as it existed under the so-called “mercantile system”’ (List 1909a: 203). Instead, his was a programme of 
emulating the successful British path to industrialisation through protectionist means and government 
intervention, which he argued remained ‘in force at this day as it was in the days of Elizabeth’ (List 1909a: 50).10 
Since the early-seventeenth century, the English had promoted woolen industries, encouraged skilled 
immigration, concluded treaties that opened up foreign markets to English goods and supported shipping 
through the Navigation Laws. By spurring urbanisation, domestic demand and economic diversification, these 
policies enabled the English to best the Dutch Republic and the Hanseatic League in commercial competition. 
Thanks to these aggressive strategies, Britain had now become ‘a land of factories and warehouses, … a sort of 
metropolis which treated the whole world as if it were a mere English province’ (List 1983: 137). 
 
However, once Britain secured the pinnacle of industrial power, her statesmen suddenly discovered the free 
trade doctrines that British economic policy had been blithely ignoring three centuries. In Erik Reinert's (2005: 
60) words, 
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Britain ‘not only made it politically clear that she saw it as a primary goal to prevent other nations from 
following the path of industrialization, but also … possessed an economic theory [in the economics of 
Smith and Ricardo] that made this goal a legitimate one. 
 
Under the veneer of fervent sermons on free trade, one could detect the familiar commercial reason of state. 
For instance, regarding Britain's commercial treaties with newly independent South American states, William 
Canning (for whom List reserved special indignation) proclaimed, ‘Spanish America is free and if we do not 
mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English’ (quoted in Kaufman 1951: 178).11 Based on these and other similar 
policy statements, List concluded that the US and continental European countries faced the 
 
real danger that the strongest nations will use the motto ‘Free Trade’ as an excuse to adopt a policy 
which will certainly enable them to dominate the trade and industry of weaker countries and reduce 
them to a condition of slavery. (List 1983: 24–5) 
 
Despite his acrimony for the likes of Canning, List had only praise for Britain and her economic performance: 
 
Let us, however, do justice to this power and to her efforts. The world has not been hindered in its 
progress, but immensely aided in it, by England. She has become an example and a pattern to all nations 
– in internal and in foreign policy, as well as in great inventions and enterprises of every kind; in 
perfecting industrial processes and means of transport, as well as in the discovery and bringing into 
cultivation uncultivated lands. (List 1909a: 250, emphases added) 
 
The point was therefore not to resent and resign in the face of the British success but to adopt it as a model. 
One first had to reject the idea of path-dependent economic specialisation whereby only Britain, by simply 
having embarked on the industrial path earlier, would keep walking it, while other countries would content 
themselves with producing agricultural commodities for export. Acquiescence by predominantly agrarian 
countries (like the USA and the members of the German Confederation) in theories of comparative advantage 
would amount to accepting the status of ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water for the Britons’ (List 1909a: 
264). In order to escape economic inferiority, it was not only possible but also necessary for such countries to 
‘emulate the pragmatism and ruthless egoism of the English people’ (Henderson 1989b: 118) by nurturing their 
productive powers through state-led industrialisation. 
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Turning the British strategy against itself, the conditio sine qua non of the project of industrialisation would be 
tariffs and duties on industrial imports that would shield the nation's infant manufactures from British 
competition. This would be coupled with the removal of all obstacles to economic circulation within the national 
borders to stoke ‘internal competition [that] amply suffices as a stimulus to emulation among manufacturers 
and traders’ (List 1909a: 222, 265). To prevent protectionism from breeding rent-seeking behaviour, List 
advocated selective and flexible duties and prescribed their subsequent removal in proportion to the 
development of national industries. The competitive edge acquired by domestic producers would be sustained 
by exposing them to the pressures of foreign competition through incremental resumption of free trade. After a 
period of temporary and selective ‘de-linking,’ a late-developer had to ‘join the international market based on 
Ricardo's comparative advantage’ for the benefit of competition to be permanent (Deckers 2007: 219). 
 
The eventual reversion to free trade clearly shows that the objective of List's national economy was not autarky. 
In stark contrast to Johann Fichte's ‘closed commercial state’ and the position of French autarkists like Mathieu 
de Dombasle, List desired to ‘build up Germany into a truly international trading power’ (Hont 2005: 153).12 As 
Todd (2015 Todd, D. (2015): 151) phrases it aptly, ‘List's nascent system of political economy amounted to an 
industrialist reinvention of jealousy [of trade].’ Much like Smith and Hume, List extolled international trade as 
‘one of the mightiest levers of civilisation and prosperity’ (List 1909c: 301). However, whereas Smith had 
predicted the convergence of national fortunes through free trade, List held that the reciprocal benefits of free 
trade accrued only under the ‘greatest possible equalisation of the most important nations of the earth in 
civilisation, prosperity, industry, and power’ (List 1909a: 277). In the absence of comparable economic 
development, the discourse of free trade made a farce of the principle of reciprocity by hoaxing the 
underdeveloped to welcome their economic backwardness. A comparison of Britain and the USA clinched the 
point, pitting national independence against economic hegemony: 
 
English national economy has for its object to manufacture for the whole world, to monopolise all 
manufacturing power. … American economy has for its object to bring into harmony the three branches 
of industry, … to be free and independent and powerful … English national economy is predominant; 
American national economy aspires only to become independent. (List 1909b: 167–8) 
 
List's plan thus defended not national isolation but national equalisation, giving late developers the opportunity 
to assume a dignified place in the international system or, in his more grandiose words, ‘the universal society of 
the future’ (List 1909a: 132). 
 
2. Civilisation, development and the imperial origins of the national economy 
 
2.1. Development as a civilising process: List's imperial horizon 
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The national economy was therefore the necessary first step to building an international order of peace and 
prosperity amongst effectively independent, equal sovereign states, stamping List's thought with the features of 
nineteenth-century liberal internationalism.13 The cosmopolitan vanishing point of List's theory has led recent 
commentators to commend it as one of ‘benevolent economic nationalism.’ For instance, Levi-Faur (1997b: 367) 
writes, ‘List's nationalism embraces a world constituted by a society of nations, and he believed that self-
determination on the basis of nationality is by its very nature progressive.’ However, there exist good reasons to 
be sceptical of this celebratory picture, as not everyone was invited to List's ‘universal society of the future’ on 
equal terms. Szporluk (1988: 126) astutely observes that List himself ‘did not consider the possibility that a 
Listian nationalism could emerge [in those regions] which in our time is known as the Third World,’ that is, what 
were in List's time the colonies and imperial dominions of European powers. When it came to the economic 
prospects of the colonies, this arch-critic of cosmopolitan economy surprisingly proclaimed, ‘here is a great 
opportunity to apply the principles of the doctrine of cosmopolitan economics in a practical way’ (List 1983: 49). 
We are confronted by a formidable ambivalence between, on the one hand, fiercely critiquing cosmopolitan 
economy as the handmaiden of economic imperialism and, on the other, advocating it in the conduct of colonial 
policy. 
 
The easy way of dispelling this ambivalence is to withdraw credence from List's principle of economic 
nationalism and recast him as a closeted imperialist who drew upon the trove of double standards amply 
furnished by nineteenth-century ideologies of imperial rule.14 However, the picture is more complicated. Above 
all, unlike early-Victorian British political economists and statesmen who espoused cosmopolitan economic 
precepts, List did not write from the seat of a powerful empire.15 Instead, speaking on behalf of continental 
Europe and America increasingly pressured by British economic policy, his case for effective national 
independence emphatically promised, in the words of Armitage (2013: 49), an ‘escape from the conditions of 
empire.’ 
 
As List's political economy eludes an easy categorisation under either the imperialist or the nationalist camp, the 
ambivalence in questions has to be tackled in another way. I think a productive way forward is to abandon the 
imperial–national dichotomy altogether and look for the imperial undercurrents within List's conceptions of the 
nation and the national economy. I argue in this section that these imperial undercurrents manifested 
themselves, first, in List's stages theory of economic development and civilisation and, second, in his definition 
of what qualifies as a ‘normal nation'. The interpenetration of national and imperial categories, in turn, 
stemmed from List's designation of the British economy as the model to be emulated by late developers. The 
geographic and institutional structure of the British economy at the time was decisively imperial rather than 
national, and its adoption by List as the template for economic development insinuated irreducibly imperial 
elements into his economic theory. 
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A major frame of historical analysis that shaped List's ideas on development was furnished by the eighteenth-
century conceptions of universal human progress which received their most systematic treatment in the Scottish 
Enlightenment's ‘four-stages theory’ (Berry 1997). Structured by an imagined continuum stretching between 
‘civilisation’ and ‘savagery', these stadial theories imposed a semblance of temporal-evolutionary order on the 
socioeconomic and cultural diversity that characterised an expanding world of colonial empires (Marshall and 
Williams 1982). We find these background assumptions reflected in List's observation that ‘an infinite difference 
exists in the conditions and circumstances of the various nations: we observe among them giants and dwarfs, 
well-formed bodies and cripples, civilised, half-civilised, and barbarous nations’ (List 1909a: 132). What 
distinguished List's theory from its eighteenth-century precursors was the ‘economic depth’ it gave to the idea 
of civilisation, ‘thus relating economic growth to other aspects of human progress’ (Adamovsky 2010: 363). On 
the one end of List's spectrum was autarkic agrarianism characteristic of barbarous nations and on the other, 
civilised nations that had attained ‘balance or harmony of the productive powers’ in industry, commerce and 
agriculture (List 1983: 46, 51, List 1909a: 96, 22).16 Echoing Smith and Hume's commercialisation thesis, List put 
the merchant before the missionary in stimulating backward, agrarian societies into economic development, 
thus endowing the extant discourses of civilisation and savagery with a secular economic substratum. 
 
List's progressive imaginary was nowhere clearer than in his discussion of agrarian societies like Russia. In 
contrast to industry's tremendous civilisational rewards, agrarian life was a deplorable thing. Consisting of 
‘primitive peasants who simply cultivate the soil', agrarian societies lacked capital, knowledge and competitive 
spirit necessary for social division of labour and consequently generated no surplus that could be traded or 
invested in manufacturing (List: 54). Their ‘intellectual powers’ always in the rot, stamped by ‘inefficiency, 
prejudices, bad habits, and vices', unable to appreciate or defend their liberties, with no capacity for self-
government, agrarian populations invariably fell prey to ‘slavery, … despotism, feudalism, and priestcraft', of 
which ‘they could not rid themselves of their own accord (List 1909a: 151).17 Given the essentially static nature 
of agrarian primitivism, List had little faith in the spontaneous workings of self-interested behaviour in bringing 
about social transformation.18 Once again, he turned to the state: ‘It is the task of politics to civilise the 
barbarous nationalities, to make the small and weak ones great and strong’ (List 1909a: 132). List's national 
economy represented not only a programme for material development but also a theory of the ‘civilising 
process’ (Tribe 1988: 33) 
 
This last point is crucial for the following reason. In early-nineteenth century European thought, the secular idea 
of the ‘civilising mission’ was chiefly an imperial notion.19 It had incubated in early-modern attempts to justify 
conquest, enslavement and empire in the Atlantic (Andrews et al. 1979, Pagden 1995), and by the 1830s and 
1840s, it had ossified into the ideological backbone of British ‘liberal imperialism,’ especially as exercised in India 
(Bell 2006, Mantena 2010, Pitts 2010). The salience of an imperial trope like the civilising mission in List's 
ostensibly nationalist agenda appears puzzling and directs us back to the ambivalence noted earlier. This 
ambivalence loses some of its mystery, however, if we recognise that Great Britain, which List admired and 
extolled as a paragon of development, possessed a distinctly imperial economy. Britain was not and had never 
been a nation-state in the stylised sense of a self-contained polity with a homogenous legal interior bounded by 
power-tight borders.20 Politically, like most European constitutional states, it was a ‘state empire’ that had 
‘developed within global systems of imperial and colonial law from the beginning’ (Tully 2008: 200). 
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Economically, it consisted of an industrialised imperial metropole and agrarian colonial peripheries harnessed 
together by global webs of commerce and finance. In other words, the ‘enviable balance between all aspects of 
economic activity’ (List 1983: 42) that List attributed to Britain was operative at the global level and ensconced 
in the politico-legal framework of the colonial empire rather than the nation-state. Within this imperial division 
of labour, England was less an autonomous island economy than a dominant hub specialising in industry and 
finance.21 To put it more starkly, London was perhaps first and foremost the metropole of an overseas empire 
and only secondarily the metropole of the English countryside.22 
 
In short, List's cherished principle of ‘the confederation and harmony of the productive powers’ that the British 
economy embodied and which List suggested to late developers as a model was based on a fundamentally 
imperial structure. In these imperial features, from which List abstracted his principles of the national economy, 
we find the key to unravelling the curious civilisational content of his economic programme. The nineteenth-
century discourse of the civilising mission pivoted on the assumed backwardness, stagnation and barbarism of 
colonial populations, which justified imperial rule and reform (Mehta 1990, 1999, Chatterjee 1993, Mantena 
2010). List's thick contempt for agrarian life can be understood as fuelled by his perception of the countryside in 
the image of the colonies and their subordinate articulation to the global economy: as agrarian hinterlands 
specialising in raw materials and foodstuffs and as dependent markets for the manufactures of industrial 
metropoles. Emulating the British imperial economy as the blueprint for national development was arguably the 
ideational conduit through which List transposed tropes of barbarism from the colonies to the European 
countryside. In the same scalar move from the imperial to the national level, the British metropole that stood as 
the beacon of progress, enlightenment and civilisation now ought to be reproduced in the form of national 
metropoles. Yet, there existed a crucial difference between the imperial and national organisations of the 
economic space, which concerned the legitimacy of economic asymmetry. Economic unevenness inherent in the 
imperial relationship lost its odium once it was recast as a national division of labour between manufacture and 
agriculture in the service of a unified national interest – the same national interest that List adduced to defend 
industrial protectionism against the charge of turning the nation into a captive market and aggrandising 
manufacturers at the expense of domestic consumers and agricultural producers (List 1909a: 49). 
 
Agrarian colonies not only furnished List with the civilisational content for representing the national countryside; 
they also structured the language in which List expressed Britain's relationship to the USA and continental 
Europe. The Anglo-American economic relations confirmed that the USA had not yet ceased to be an informal 
colony,23 as its dependent specialisation in agricultural exports dragged her into the ‘whirlpool of [British] 
agricultural, industrial, and commercial crises’ (List 1983: 56, List 1909a: 200). The British now strove to impress 
the same upon Germany, aiming at ‘nothing less than the overthrow of the entire German protective system, in 
order to reduce Germany to the position of an English agricultural colony’ (List 1909a: 272). Such economic 
peripheralisation portended a ‘colonial or quasi-colonial status’ (Deckers: 218) under what Bagchi (2009) has 
labelled ‘export-led exploitation’ characteristic of nineteenth-century economic imperialism. Britain's success in 
raising ‘her entire territory into one immense manufacturing, commercial, maritime city’ depended on making 
‘all the peoples of the earth her tributaries', from which she did not spare fellow Europeans (List 1909a: 240).24 
As attested by the profound resonance and popularity with which Listian arguments were received by late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth anti-colonial movements, List's mobilisation of colonial imagery was not mere 
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literary flourish. It actually captured the structural and socio-spatial unevenness of the nineteenth-century 
global capitalist order as well as the anxieties it induced in the intelligentsia of the subordinate and peripheral 
regions (Goswami 2004: 216–21). 
 
The threat went beyond economic precarity, dependency and unequal exchange. It implicated the very 
imagination of Europe as a beacon of civilisation in the world. If British economic predominance were to 
continue unabated, through inaction, complicity or corruption of continental statesmen, it would end in a 
crushing and irreversible world empire. Sidelining ‘the benighted countries of the Continent', British capital and 
labour would flow to Britain's colonies, whereby ‘Asia, Africa, and Australia would be civilised by England, and 
covered with new states modelled after the English fashion’ (List 1909a: 104). Potential consequences were truly 
depressing for List. In this English world, 
 
the European Continental nations would be lost as unimportant, unproductive races. By this 
arrangement it would fall to the lot of France, together with Spain and Portugal, to supply this English 
world with the choicest wines, and to drink the bad ones herself: at most France might retain the 
manufacture of a little millinery. Germany would scarcely have more to supply this English world with 
than children's toys, wooden clocks, and philological writings, and sometimes also an auxiliary corps, 
who might sacrifice themselves to pine away in the deserts of Asia or Africa, for the sake of extending 
the manufacturing and commercial supremacy, the literature and language of England. It would not 
require many centuries before people in this English world would think and speak of the Germans and 
French in the same tone as we speak at present of the Asiatic nations. (List 1909a: 104)25 
 
This dramatic passage demonstrates how List telescoped the present state of Britain's colonies, and especially of 
India, into a disgraceful image of the future of continental Europe: deindustrialisation and economic 
marginalisation, consignment to supplying luxuries and trivialities to the imperial metropole, demeaning 
mercenary employment of German citizens in Britain's colonial ventures (much like the British East India 
Company's Sepoy army) and, above all, the reduction of continental Europeans to the same status as the 
barbarous peoples of Britain's imperial dominions.26 And just as List's anti-imperial critique drew inspiration 
from India's subordinate integration to global capitalist networks, Indian nationalists in the 1880s and 1890s 
would draw upon Listian vocabulary to arraign British colonial rule for turning India into the ‘countryside of 
Britain', that is, into an agrarian hinterland and captive market (Goswami 2004: 228). 
 
At this point, List's conjectures about Britain's treatment of ‘the whole world as if it were a mere English 
province’ appear in a more urgent light. Judged by the tight entwinement of economic development and 
civilisation in List's thought, falling prey to deindustrialisation would spell nothing short of a ‘relapse into a state 
of barbarism’ (List 1983: 74). Shot through with imperial categories of civilisation of savagery, Britain's economic 
supremacy portended nothing less than the provincialisation of Europe.27 
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2.2. Imperialising the nation, internationalising the empire 
 
The same colonial vocabulary in which List explained Britain's relationship to Germany also structured his basic 
definition of the ‘nation’ and its coordinates in the international order. In a passage worth citing in length, List 
wrote, 
 
A nation in its normal state possesses one common language and literature, a territory endowed with 
manifold natural resources, extensive, and with convenient frontiers and a numerous population. 
Agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation must be all developed in it proportionately; arts 
and sciences, educational establishments, and universal cultivation must stand in it on an equal footing 
with material production. Its constitution, laws, and institutions must afford to those who belong to it a 
high degree of security and liberty, and must promote religion, morality, and prosperity; in a word, must 
have the well-being of its citizens as their object. It must possess sufficient power on land and at sea to 
defend its independence and to protect its foreign commerce. It will possess the power of beneficially 
affecting the civilisation of less advanced nations, and by means of its own surplus population and of 
their mental and material capital to found colonies and beget new nations. (List 1909a: 132–3) 
 
Up until the last sentence, this definition fits the secular, Enlightenment conception of the nation prevalent in 
the ‘age of revolution'. It combines ideational elements of ‘liberal nationalism’ influential between 1830 and 
1870 (Szporluk 1988: 109–15, Hobsbawm 1990: 30–2),28 traces of the ‘fiscal-military’ state carried over from the 
early-modern period (Brewer 1989) and basic tenets of German cameralism and ‘policy science’ (Tribe 1995, 
Reinert 2005, Wakefield 2014). What is more significant, however, is the inclusion in the ‘normal’ definition of 
the nation the capacity to ‘civilise less advanced nations’ and expand via settler colonialism, which suggests that 
List's national economy represented not so much an alternative to imperial economy as a specific modulation of 
it.29 This last point was reflected in List's praise of colonialism as an economic strategy: ‘The highest means of 
development of the manufacturing power, of the internal and external commerce proceeding from it, of any 
considerable coast and sea navigation, of extensive sea fisheries, and consequently of a respectable naval 
power, are colonies’ (List 1909a: 192–3). Colonialism was therefore not incidental to the national economy. 
Rather than an auxiliary project that a fully constituted nation might choose to engage in, it was forwarded as a 
vital process that entered the very construction of the national economy.30 
 
Thus conceived, the construction of the national economy proceeded in and through an international division of 
labour in which 
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The mother nation supplies the colonies with manufactured goods, and obtains in return their surplus 
produce of agricultural products and raw materials; this interchange gives activity to its manufactures, 
augments thereby its population and the demand for its internal agricultural products, and enlarges its 
mercantile marine and naval power. The superior power of the mother country in population, capital, 
and enterprising spirit, obtains through colonisation an advantageous outlet, which is again made good 
with interest by the fact that a considerable portion of those who have enriched themselves in the 
colony bring back the capital which they have acquired there, and pour it into the lap of the mother 
nation, or expend their income in it. (List 1909a: 193) 
 
Under the surface of this abstract economic formulation lurked the historical experience of empire, especially 
that of the British in South Asia, which shone through List's justification of this asymmetric division of labour by 
once again resorting to the language of the civilising mission. Simply by virtue of free trade, colonial populations 
would be led by the ‘civilised nations of the earth … along the path of security of law and order, of civilisation 
and prosperity’ (List 1909a: 191). 
 
This argument was not original in itself. The ‘Colonial Reform Movement’ in Britain, with Wakefield at the 
theoretical helm, had been advocating colonisation on political-economic grounds for some time, which would 
later inspire Mill (1965: 372) to declare ‘colonisation’ to be the ‘the very best affair of business, in which the 
capital of an old and wealthy country can possibly engage’ (also see Bell 2010). The crucial difference was that 
both Wakefield and Mill defended the principle of colonisation on self-avowedly imperial grounds, whereas List 
enlisted the same to the cause of national development. For nowhere List expressly advocated the formation of 
a German or American ‘empire’ a term he reserved for the territorial empires of Turkey, Russia, or Napoleonic 
France.31 He also eschewed advocacy of conquest and military might in colonisation and, echoing the 
nineteenth-century ideology of liberal imperialism, restricted the means of colonisation to ‘trade’ and 
‘settlement'. 
 
Advocating an essentially imperial division of labour while maintaining a formally national paradigm or, more 
precisely, carving out a nominally national economic space out of the thicket of imperial economic relations, 
hinged on one further theoretical move: the effacement of the historical violence through which the British 
Empire had come into being. The British story could be presented as a model for emulation palatable to liberal 
internationalist sensibilities only if it were evacuated of ignominious violence of colonial dispossession, 
extirpation and enslavement. List's strategy was to displace the imperial division of labour onto a natural 
division of labour and to imbue its progress with a sense of historical fatalism. ‘Both international and national 
division of labour are chiefly determined by climate and by Nature herself,’ wrote List and continued, 
 
The countries of the world most favoured by nature, with regard to both national and international 
division of labour … are the countries of the temperate zone; for in these countries the manufacturing 
power especially prospers, by means of which the nation not merely attains to the highest degree of 
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mental and social development and of political power, but is also enabled to make the countries of 
tropical climates and of inferior civilisation tributary in a certain measure to itself. (List 1909a: 123–4) 
 
Since this division of labour was based on natural causes, there was no reason to expect that they would or 
should change anytime. Therefore there existed no grounds for claiming injuries from the ‘tributary’ relations in 
which European powers had placed the peoples of the ‘torrid zones'. List's depiction of the international division 
of labour was in effect the imperial division of labour redux, with path-dependent specialisation now stamped by 
the immutable imprimatur of nature. 
 
List adduced a stylised history of the British India to vindicate his point: 
 
this exchange between the countries of the temperate zone and the countries of the torrid zone is 
based upon natural causes, and will be so for all time. Hence India has given up her manufacturing 
power with her independence to England. (List 1909a: 192) 
 
He conveniently stepped over the question of whether India had lost her independence due to ‘natural causes,’ 
circumventing decades of military conquest, legal domination and forced deindustrialisation that had turned 
India into an agrarian satellite (Washbrook 1981, 1999, Sartori 2006, 2008). Instead, he went on to generalise 
from the Indian example about the inexorable fate of Asia as a whole: 
 
Wherever the mouldering civilisation of Asia comes into contact with the fresh atmosphere of Europe, it 
falls to atoms; and Europe will sooner or later find herself under the necessity of taking the whole of 
Asia under her care and tutelage, as already India has been so taken in charge by England. In this utter 
chaos of countries and peoples there exists no single nationality which is either worthy or capable of 
maintenance and regeneration. Hence the entire dissolution of the Asiatic nationalities appears to be 
inevitable, and a regeneration of Asia only possible by means of an infusion of European vital power, by 
the general introduction of the Christian religion and of European moral laws and order, by European 
immigration, and the introduction of European systems of government. (List 1909a: 282) 
 
In this narrative brimming with imperial confidence, List attributed the deindustrialisation, peripheralisation and 
subordination of the subcontinent solely to the organisational and technological superiority of Europeans that 
enabled them to invade South Asian markets with cheap commodities.32 
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By contrast, the same natural causes that obviated the question of national independence in the torrid zone 
necessarily gave rise to the same question in the temperate zone. For instance, American colonies had seceded 
from Britain as soon as the imperial ties of dependency frustrated American aspirations to local industrialisation. 
‘Canada will also secede after she has reached the same point,’ and ‘independent agricultural manufacturing 
states will also arise in the countries of temperate climate in Australia in the course of time’ (List 1909a: 193). 
The question of national independence via economic development was therefore confined to relations amongst 
European polities and settler ‘neo-Europes’ (Belich 2009) where economic dependency represented ‘a condition 
of slavery’ that affronted liberal and civilised sensibilities. In contrast, the same relations of dependency 
between (neo-)European polities and the rest of the world, far from being a moral aberration, constituted the 
very mechanism of historical progress of mankind, as ‘experience shows that the barbarous or semi-barbarous 
peoples of Asia, Africa, and South America who have become civilised have always been those whom the 
industrialised states have provided with stable administrations, protections of persons and property and 
freedom of trade (List 1983: 49). It followed that the same cosmopolitan doctrine that had to be combated in 
Europe ought to be promoted in economic dealings with the colonies by abandoning those national jealousies 
characteristic of the old mercantile system. While List conceded that ‘it might, at first sight, appear to be asking 
too much of England to open her colonies to the commerce of all nations', he deemed the liberalisation of 
colonial trade to be essential ‘for the future prosperity of both advanced countries and backward and barbarous 
peoples’ (List 1983: 49).33 
 
List's respective assignment of national and cosmopolitan doctrines to what we today call the ‘global north’ and 
the ‘global south’ would suggest that his theory of economic nationalism was not antithetical to the economy of 
empire. Rather, the national economy historically presupposed and theoretically subsumed imperial economic 
relations. It constituted less a universal path out of tributary subordination to the British industrial-financial 
metropole than a strategy for late developers like Germany, France and the USA to gain entry to an expanded 
global circle of industrial and financial powers. By positing protectionism at home and colonisation abroad as the 
twin pillars of national economic development, List in effect promoted the political internalisation rather than 
the displacement of the imperial core–periphery relations. Put differently, List's theory took empire out of 
imperialism by substituting the nation for it. His programme for the internal unification of Germany was 
intimately wedded to a programme of external expansion that he expressed in unambiguous terms in the 
 
unalterable laws of nature by which civilised nations are driven on with the irresistible power to extend 
or transfer their powers of production to less cultivated countries … population, powers of mind, 
material capital attain such dimensions that they must necessarily flow over into other less civilised 
countries. (List 1909a: 100) 
 
As Brady (1943: 121–2) notes, expansion and Machtpolitik were inherent in the strategy of economic 
organisation List advocated. Like Krupp and Bismarck after him, List found himself ‘talking the language of 
empire without scarcely knowing it', and in his proposals for the peaceful conquest of markets and raw 
materials, ‘imperialism went “underground”’. 
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This last point brings us full circle to the problem of the ‘jealousy of trade’ that List placed at the centre of his 
critique of cosmopolitan economy. The inevitable mobility of capital, commodities, people and technology from 
developed to underdeveloped countries once again raised the problem of inter-state rivalry and conflict.34 As 
Rothschild (2012) and Hont (2005: 6) have both argued, Adam Smith had avoided outlining an international 
political-institutional order for governing inter-state commercial rivalry. List confronted this problem with a two-
step solution. The first was to establish a balance of wealth between major European and neo-European powers 
through industrial policy and strike economic alliances initially between continental nations against Britain and 
subsequently between Britain and European powers against the economic giants of the future, the USA and 
Russia.35 Building on the first, the second step would be to construct an international treaty framework of 
‘federative political associations', which would provide ‘political coverage to the entire world market’ (Hont 
2005: 153).36 List struck an optimistic tenor on this point, since he glimpsed an enlightened cognisance of 
economic interdependency in the ‘congresses of the great European powers', in which ‘Europe possessed 
already the embryo of a future congress of nations’ (List 1909a: 100). 
 
List's own proposal to nurture this embryo was to set up a ‘world trade congress’ composed of European and 
neo-European states. The congress would function as a platform for negotiating ‘how the common interests of 
the various nations can be best served,’ including ‘regions and societies at different stages of economic 
development – such as industrialised, agrarian, colonial and primitive societies’ (List 1983: 126). List brought 
under the roof of the same international organisation the enlightened principle of equality and reciprocity 
between independent nations and a doctrine of tutelage over colonial societies. By politically entrenching global 
economic relations of core and periphery and vesting in a congress of ‘civilised nations’ the power to decide the 
fate of the ‘barbaric peoples', the world trade congress in certain measure sought to ‘internationalise’ imperial 
relations.37 It also disclosed, once again, that the nations for which List sought a rightful place under the sun 
were, actual or potential, imperial nations. Belying its avowed nationalism, the politico-legal framework for List's 
theory of economic development was not the nation-state but the colonial empire. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing exposition it is tempting to conclude that List was yet another nineteenth-century 
imperialist who clothed his imperial agenda in the nominal anti-imperialism of the national principle. Yet such a 
dismissal would be hasty. List's theory was animated by a genuinely anti-imperial sentiment, as attested by his 
reference to Britain's colonies as the living proof of the dangers of economic peripheralisation, indignity and 
injustice that hovered above continental Europe.38 On the other hand, its anti-imperialist edge hardly warrants 
celebrating List's theory as one of ‘benevolent economic nationalism’ (Levi-Faur 1997b: 367) or as a humanist 
corrective to the shallow materialism of classical political economy (Winch 1998). As we have seen, by 
substantively predicating the national economy on imperial relations of production and exchange and by 
positing the ‘civilising mission’ as central to internal consolidation and external expansion, List effectively 
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confined the national principle to European states and their neo-European offshoots, denying the possibility of 
independent national development to the rest of the world. What carried the emancipatory promise of List's 
theory beyond Europe was not its universal and inclusive principles, but its practical appropriation by late-
nineteenth and twentieth-century decolonisation struggles as a weapon against European imperialism.39 
 
As Goswami (2004: 220) argues in a brilliant study of the birth of economic nationalism in colonial India, ‘it was 
precisely the promise of formally replicable, self-engendered, and territorially delimited economic development, 
which underwrote Listian national developmentalism, that helped propel its increasing popularity'. While the 
success of Listian strategies in the USA, Germany and Japan certainly reinforced their appeal to anti-colonial and 
post-colonial developmental ambitions (Goswami 2004: 221), the reason for the National System's ‘profound 
resonance’ in the Indian context is to be sought in the structurally analogous position of Germany in the first and 
India in the second half of the nineteenth century in the global expansion of capitalist networks dominated by 
Great Britain. As I have argued, List articulated his account of Anglo-German economic relations in the image of 
quasi-colonial dependency and peripheralisation, whereby India's present portended Germany's future. Thus it 
is not surprising to see Indian nationalists like Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) and Govind Ranade (1842–1901), 
who likewise assigned India's poverty to its status as a ‘dependent colonial economy', to find inspiration in List's 
anti-imperialist motif of economic independence (Goswami 1998: 615). Like List before them, they were 
engaged in the effort to carve out and call into existence a distinctly national space from the transnational and 
imperial political-economic structures in which their imagined communities were enmeshed. Even List's stadial-
universalist equation of ‘civilization’ with industrialisation and development would insinuate itself into Indian 
nationalist thought (Goswami 1998: 628). 
 
Yet, List's ideas did not travel to colonial contexts lock, stock and barrel but were pushed in radical directions 
where List himself did not venture. Ranade, for instance, despite being the ‘chief exponent of List’ in India, 
declaimed against the politically anodyne, climactic version of the imperial division of labour that List snuck back 
into his theory (Goswami 2004: 211). Extricating national developmentalism from the imperial tapestry into 
which it was originally woven owed less to an internal theoretical critique than to its circulation in contexts and 
deployment for political purposes that were not intended or even imagined by List himself. List had called upon 
the statesmen of ‘second-rate industrialising countries', like Germany and the USA, but his call was also heard 
and answered by the colonised to whom it was emphatically not addressed. Consequently, national 
developmentalism morphed from a crypto-imperial strategy into a crystallised expression of anti-imperial 
animus. As Goswami notes, ‘by refracting and reworking the problem of political-economic autonomy and 
development with specific reference to colonial unevennes, they [Indian nationalists] radicalized its political 
signification, deepened its social reference, and transformed the “original” in turn’ (Goswami 2004: 280). The 
long ‘radical afterlife’ of List's theory, its subsequent adoptions and reformulations in the service of various anti-
colonial struggles and post-colonial projects, can also explain how it has shed its imperial baggage over the 
course of the twentieth century such that the nation-state could emerge as the political unit of analysis of 
economic development. The theoretical genealogy of the ‘national economy’ is thereby partly the record of the 
ideological-institutional reformulations that have effaced the assumptions of economic unevenness and logics of 
peripheralisation that List had originally built into his theory of economic nationalism. 
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Post-revolutionary debates on ‘socialism in one country’ (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969) and postwar 
theories of ‘stages of economic growth’ (Rostow 1960) would be obvious cases in such a genealogy of the 
national economy. But perhaps more illustrative of the imperial erasure in the field of political economy is the 
recent turn in institutional economics to histories of colonialism as an explanatory factor in contemporary levels 
of development (Acemoglu et al. 2000, Diamond and Robinson 2010, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Put 
summarily, these studies correlate different colonial heritages with divergent national economic performances 
in the present, linking the two through the historical continuity of growth-enhancing or growth-inhibiting 
institutions. What tend to get screened out in these accounts are processes of expropriation, extraction and 
exploitation that were constitutive of these colonial lineages. In particular, the treatment of ‘neo-Europes’ 
(Anglophone settler colonies) as exemplary cases in the continuity of growth-enhancing institutions looks past 
histories of extirpation and extreme marginalisation of the indigenous populations and their non-capitalist social 
institutions. 
 
Broadening our scope from the nation-state to the colonial empire in political-economic analysis suggests that if 
one leg of the developmental ‘ladder’ stood on innovation, industry and liberal institutions, the other rested on 
colonial dispossession, displacement and exploitation. Taking the nation-state as the principal political unit of 
economic development sequesters economic development from imperial histories of coercion, leaving us with 
etiolated correlations between such sanitised variables as ‘direct rule,’ ‘indirect rule’ and ‘economic growth’ 
(Lange 2009). Excavating the imperial moorings of the national economy discloses the historical embeddedness 
of the nation-state in enduring colonial lineages and call for critically scrutinising our categories of economic 
development, state-building and international relations. 
 
Secondly, we can still discern ambivalences attendant to economic nationalism in contemporary debates about 
development. List's arguments were rekindled in the long winter of neoliberalism by a number of development 
economists who challenged the ideological tide of the Washington Consensus (Chang 2003, Wade 2003, 2006, 
Kohli 2004, Weiss 2005, Amsden 2007). While these neo-Listian efforts are valuable in highlighting the neoliberal 
intensification of economic dependency and calling for enlarging the policy space available to developing 
nations, they ignore what Selwyn (2009: 167) calls ‘List's dark side', namely, labour repression that accompanies 
late-development attempts through ‘state capitalism'. Selwyn's argument can be amplified by being placed in 
the imperial framework developed in this essay. If List's scheme of a national economy is indeed inspired by 
Britain's imperial division of labour, then it becomes possible to view many postcolonial state-led 
industrialisation attempts (Scott 1998) as partaking in a mode of ‘internal colonialism’ whereby the countryside 
is subordinated to the imperatives of urbanisation and industrialisation.40 
 
Finally, List continues to resonate with debates in international political economy over neomercantilism, be it in 
the domineering performance of Germany's export economy or in Chinese interventionism to achieve the same 
effect. In another ironic twist of history, the same Germany that List feared would be provincialised by British 
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supremacy has emerged from the 2008 crisis as the leading ‘core’ European economy, preaching the virtues of 
innovation, competitiveness and fiscal discipline to the ‘peripheral’ economies of southern Europe. The 
precocious vision of a ‘united Europe’ attributed to List (Roussakis 1968, Reinert 2005, Winch 1998) has come to 
pass in the form of European customs and monetary union, though not without reproducing the core–periphery 
relations that List sought to exorcise from the continent.41 
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Notes 
 
1. Robbins (1998 Robbins, L. (1998), A History of Economic Thought: The LSE Lectures (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press).: 240) in his acclaimed LSE lectures compared List only to Adam Smith and Karl Marx in terms of 
the influence he exerted on the economic policy of his time. 
 
2. See, for instance, the report on ‘state capitalism’ published in The Economist (Wooldridge 2012 Wooldridge, 
A. (2012), ‘Special Report: State Capitalism’, The Economist, 21 January. Available from: 
http://www.economist.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/node/21542931 [accessed 15 October 2013].); Halper's (2010 
Halper, S. (2010), The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in Our Time (New York: Basic Books).) 
neologism, ‘Beijing consensus’; Bremmer (2010 Bremmer, I. (2010), The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the 
War Between States and and Corporations? (New York: Portfolio).) and MacGregor's (2012 MacGregor, J. (2012), 
No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism (Westport, CT: 
Prospecta).) portents of the ‘end of the free market’ and the rise of ‘authoritarian capitalism.’ The opinion is 
succinctly captured by Prestowitz (2012 Prestowitz, C. (2012), ‘China's Not Breaking the Rules. It's Playing a 
Different Game’, Foreign Policy, February 17. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/17/chinas-not-
breaking-the-rules-its-playing-a-different-game/ [accessed 15 October 2013].), who writes ‘most of Asia, much 
of South America, the Middle East, Germany and parts of Europe are playing neo-mercantilism'. 
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3. For an authoritative personal and intellectual biography of List (see Henderson 1983 Henderson, W.O. (1983), 
Friedrich List: Economist and Visionary, 1789–1846 (London: Routledge).). 
 
4. List spent considerable time in France, first in 1822, then in 1831 and 1837–1840. The latest and longest 
phase of his residence coincided with the wake of the French national controversy on free trade in 1834. For an 
excellent reconstruction of nineteenth-century French debates on protectionism and free trade, as well as the 
impact of these debates on List's political economy (see Todd 2015 Todd, D. (2015), Free Trade and Its Enemies 
in France, 1814–1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).), especially chapter 4. 
 
5. Dupin also used the term ‘productive forces' in referring to the development of industry, though he and List 
arrived at these cognate concepts independently (Todd 2015 Todd, D. (2015), Free Trade and Its Enemies in 
France, 1814–1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).: 149). 
 
6. It should be noted that Smith held an ambivalent position on the relationship between agriculture and 
manufactures. On the one hand, he contrasted the ‘unnatural and retrograde' urban-commercial development 
of Europe with the ‘natural course' of opulence in agrarian American colonies. On the other, he expressly 
conceded that division of labour, the principal force of productivity, found greater room for improvement in 
manufacturing than in agriculture, and that civilised and wealthy countries were distinguished from their 
barbarous and poor counterparts by their advancement in manufactures (see Smith 1981 Smith, A. (1981), An 
Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund).: 308–11, Hopkins 2013 Hopkins, T. (2013), 
‘Adam Smith on American Economic Development and the Future of the European Atlantic Empires’, in S. 
Reinert and P. Røge (eds), The Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan), pp. 53–75.). 
 
7. List frequently adduced as support to his protectionist advocacy the continental blockade during the 
Napoleonic Wars, which cut off trade with Britain and forced France and Russia to develop their own 
manufacturing capacity. He reserved special praise for Count Karl Nesselrode in Russia and Antoine Chaptal in 
France as practical statesmen who oversaw the industrial policy of the two countries and grasped the centrality 
of industrial independence to economic independence more broadly. Chaptal, in particular, represented for List 
the revival of Colbertian policies, which List wholeheartedly supported and which earned Chaptal the reputation 
of ‘a Colbert of the nineteenth century’ (List 1909a List, F. (1909a), The National System of Political Economy 
(London: Longmans).: 80–1, Henderson 1989a Henderson, W.O. (1989a), ‘Friedrich List and the French 
Protectionists’, in W.O. Henderson (ed.), Marx, Engels, and the English Workers, and Other Essays (London: 
Frank Cass), pp. 104–116.: 106). 
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8. Gallagher-Robinson thesis has not been without its detractors. For a frontal criticism (see Platt 1968 Platt, 
D.C.M. (1968), ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations’, The Economic History Review, 21, pp. 296–
306. doi: 10.2307/2592437). 
 
9. A major obstacle to effective tariffs was the preponderance of Prussian agrarian interests that preferred a 
more liberal trade regime than demanded by Rhenish and south German manufacturing concerns. For a brief 
and instructive account (see Henderson 1935 Henderson, W.O. (1935), ‘The Rise of German Industry’, The 
Economic History Review, 5, pp. 120–4. doi: 10.2307/2599206). List was familiar with the effects of fragmented 
economic interests on the obstruction of tariff policy, as he had observed a comparable dynamic play out 
between the Southern planters and Northeastern industrialists in the United States prior to his return to Europe. 
 
10. For an instructive historical account of English protectionist strategies (see O'Brien 1998 O'Brien, P. (1998), 
‘Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688–1815’, in P.J. 
Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 53–77., 
Chang 2003 Chang, H.-J. (2003), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(London: Anthem).: 19–24, Morgan 2002 Morgan, K. (2002), ‘Mercantilism and the British Empire’, in D. Winch 
and P. O'Brien (eds), The Political Economy of the British Historical Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 165–92.). Reinert (2005 Reinert, E. (2005), ‘German Economics and Development Economics’, in E. Reinert 
and J.S. Komo (eds), The Origins of Development Economics (London: Zed Books), pp. 48–68.: 49) also notes the 
similarity between the German economic tradition and pre-Smithian English economics. 
 
11. List trained his sights on George Canning and William Huskisson as early as his Outlines of American Political 
Economy. There he wrote, ‘the seeming adherence of Messrs. Canning and Messrs. Huskisson to Messrs. Say 
and Smith's theory is one of the most extraordinary of first-rate political maneuvers that have ever been played 
upon the credulity of the world’ (List 1909b List, F. (1909b), ‘Outlines of American Political Economy’, in M. Hirst 
(ed.), Life of Friedrich List and Selected Writings (London: Smith), pp. 145–272.: 178). 
 
12. For a detailed examination of Fichte's theory of closed commercial state (see Nakhimovsky 2011 
Nakhimovksy, I. (2011), The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau 
to Fichte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).). List's writings on the American economy in the late 1820s 
betray an autarkist streak, which can be attributed to the uniquely continental scale of the US economy that 
suggested self-sufficiency as a viable idea. By the late 1830s, List openly distanced his position, very much like 
Thiers, from autarky and free trade alike (Todd 2015 Todd, D. (2015), Free Trade and Its Enemies in France, 
1814–1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).: 146). 
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13. Bell and Sylvest (2006 Bell, D. and Sylvest, C. (2006), ‘International Society in Victorian Political Thought: T. H. 
Green, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick’, Modern Intellectual History, 3, pp. 207–38. doi: 
10.1017/S1479244306000837: 211) define liberal internationalism as the belief that ‘it was possible to build a 
just order on the basis of existing patterns of cooperation between distinct political communities'. List's theory 
belonged to this species of thought by virtue of its equidistance to utopian cosmopolitanism and ethnocentric 
nationalism. 
 
14. On nineteenth-century ideologies of imperial rule (see Mehta 1999 Mehta, U. (1999), Liberalism and Empire: 
A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press)., Moloney 2001 
Moloney, P. (2001), ‘Savagery and Civilization: Early Victorian Notions’, New Zealand Journal of History, 35, pp. 
153–76., Pitts 2005 Pitts, J. (2005), A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).). 
 
15. Although List was very knowledgeable in British economic history and political economy, he did not spend 
any substantial time in Britain. He paid only two visits to the island towards the end of his life, which do not 
appear to have had a major impact on the principles of his political economy (see Henderson 1989b Henderson, 
W.O. (1989b), ‘Friedrich List and England’, in W.O. Henderson (ed.), Marx, Engels, and the English Workers, and 
Other Essays (London: Frank Cass), pp. 117–34.). 
 
16. It is worth noting that List did not spare European countries from the civilisational hierarchy of his theory of 
development. He placed Spain, Portugal and Southern Italy in the barbarous first stage of economic progress 
(List 1909a List, F. (1909a), The National System of Political Economy (London: Longmans).: 96). 
 
17. List saw the absence of an enlightened and entrepreneurial middle class as both the cause and the sign of a 
country's socioeconomic backwardness. He adduced the economic stagnation of Russia and the demise of 
Poland as evidence for this observation (List 1909a List, F. (1909a), The National System of Political Economy 
(London: Longmans).: 82, 139). List was in fact echoing a broader agreement amongst Western European 
philosophers and political economists who indexed civilisational advancement to the growth of a robust ‘third 
estate’ located between the leisurely aristocratic classes and the mass of poor peasants and labourers (see 
Adamovsky 2010 Adamovsky, E. (2010), ‘Before Development Economics: Western Political Economy, the 
“Russian Case,” and the First Perceptions of Economic Backwardness (from the 1760s Until the Mid-Twentieth 
Century)’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 32, pp. 349–76. doi: 10.1017/S1053837210000313). 
 
18. On this point, List prefigured Marx (1978a Marx, K. (1978a), ‘British Rule in India’, in R. Tucker (ed.), Marx-
Engels Reader (New York: Norton), pp. 653–58., 1978b Marx, K. (1978b), ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte’, in R. Tucker (ed.), Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton), pp. 594–617.) and Marx and Engels 
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(1978 Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1978), ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’, in R. Tucker (ed.), Marx-Engels Reader 
(New York: Norton), pp. 469–500.), who would pour scorn on the peasantry as ‘a sack of potatoes’ who 
languished in the ‘idiocy of rural life,’ and who had no hope of redemption until national bourgeoisies of 
continental Europe would stand on their feet and bring upon them the calamitous but progressive 
transformation that the British rule wrought in India. Also see Semmel (1993 Semmel, B. (1993), Liberal Ideal 
and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press).) on Marx and Engels's engagement with theories of economic nationalism. 
 
19. This is not to imply that ‘civilisation’ itself was an inherently imperial concept, though it lent itself to be 
employed for justifying claims of imperial tutelage over colonial populations. For a detailed study (see Mehta 
1999 Mehta, U. (1999), Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 
IL: Chicago University Press).). Secondly, ‘civilising mission’ could rest as much on agrarianist arguments as 
industrial ones, as attested by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson's denial to Native Americans proprietary rights 
in America until they enclosed and ‘improved’ the land (see Arneil 1995 Arneil, B. (1995), John Locke and 
America: The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press).). 
 
20. There exists a substantial literature that critiques the Westphalian paradigm from political, legal and 
economic angles (see, for example, Benton 2010 Benton, L. (2010), A Search for Sovereignty: Law and 
Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)., Teschke 2003 Teschke, 
B. (2003), The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: 
Verso).). 
 
21. List saw the agricultural protectionism of the Corn Laws as a colossal anomaly to Britain's propensity to 
become the ‘industrial metropolis of the world’ and attributed this aberration to British landowners’ lack of 
vision (List 1983 List, F. (1983), The Natural System of Political Economy (London: Frank Cass).: 138). 
 
22. For a theorisation of the colonial empire, rather than the nation-state, as the politico-legal framework of 
commercial-capitalist relations (see Ince 2014 Ince, O. (2014), ‘Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and 
Global Land Grabs: A Theoretical Intervention’, Rural Sociology, 79, pp. 104–131. doi: 10.1111/ruso.12025). On 
the importance of colonial commerce in developing capitalist techniques of mass production, processing and 
consumption in early-modern England (see Pincus 2009 Pincus, S. (2009), 1688: The First Modern Revolution 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).: 82–7, Zahedieh 2010 Zahedieh, N. (2010), Capital and the Colonies: 
London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).). 
 
23. Marx (1976 Marx, K. (1976), Capital Vol. 1: Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin).: 931) would 
reiterate this argument in Capital: ‘The United States are, speaking economically, still only a colony of Europe.’ 
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Gallagher and Robinson (1953 Gallagher, J. and Robinson, R. (1953), ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The 
Economic History Review, 6, pp. 1–15. doi: 10.2307/2591017: 10) restrict this colonial relationship to the 
southern states of the USA. 
 
24. On the profound, if under-acknowledged, influence of List's theory on neo-Marxist critiques of imperialism 
(see Semmel 1993 Semmel, B. (1993), Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from 
Adam Smith to Lenin (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).: 165–6, 188–9). 
 
25. These notes of alarm closely mirrored the concerns of French protectionists like Dupin, who warned that 
‘absolute liberty’ in foreign trade would leave France with ‘one or two industries’ (Todd 2015 Todd, D. (2015), 
Free Trade and Its Enemies in France, 1814–1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).: 126). 
 
26. Further dramatising the colonial imagery, List (1909a List, F. (1909a), The National System of Political 
Economy (London: Longmans).: 264) wrote, 
 
the islanders would not even grant to the poor Germans what they conceded to the conquered Hindoos … In 
vain did the Germans humble themselves to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water for the 
Britons. The latter treated them worse than a subject people. 
 
27. The tacit reference here is to Chakrabarty (2000 Chakrabarty, D. (2000), Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).). I argue that List offers us a 
glimpse into another aspect of provinciality of Europe, which eludes Chakrabarty's optic of ‘historical difference’ 
and cannot be accessed without due attention to the language of political economy in which vagaries of 
imperialism were articulated. 
 
28. List was not an ethnocentric nationalist. His American citizenship aside, he addressed his works equally to 
American, French and German audiences. He also distanced himself from essentialist conceptions of race and 
blood, which he deemed irrelevant to economic development. Yet, the secular Enlightenment understanding of 
the nation to which he subscribed also entailed a standard of viability in terms of size, population and resources. 
On these grounds, List deemed the Netherlands and Denmark to be unviable nations and envisaged their 
eventual annexation by a unified Germany (see List 1909a List, F. (1909a), The National System of Political 
Economy (London: Longmans).: 56–7, 133). 
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29. ‘Less advanced nations’ (‘minder vorgerückter Nationen’ in the original) also included backward, agrarian 
countries of Southern Europe (see footnote 16 above). Yet List nowhere makes a case for imperial tutelage over 
these countries the way he deemed necessary and inescapable for Asia. Reasons for this differential treatment 
are discussed below. 
 
30. List's case for late-industrialising nations and his defense of colonial expansion as economic strategy explains 
his enthusiastic support for the French occupation of Algeria, further illustrating his preference for a European, 
as opposed to narrowly German, cause for catching up with Britain. He even obtained a commission from his 
friend Thiers for his son to serve as a military officer in Algeria (Todd 2012 Todd, D. (2012), ‘Protectionism as 
Internationalist Liberalism’. Available from: 
http://www.booksandideas.net/spip.php?page=print&id_article=1739 [accessed 10 September 2015].). For 
German colonial expansion, List personally recommended Central and South America. The American experience 
of compounding formal independence from imperial Britain with ongoing settler-colonial expansionism appears 
to be a major inspiration here, formed during List's American sojourn. 
 
31. List frequently spoke of Russia, Turkey and Napoleonic France as ‘empires’ (‘Reichs’) – ‘die russischen 
Reichs,’ ‘die türkischen Reichs,’ ‘das französisches Kaiserreich’. His invocations of ‘German Empire’ (‘deutschen 
Reichs’) are strictly restricted to the Holy Roman Empire. Curiously, he refrained from coupling ‘English’ and 
‘British’ with ‘empire', except for ‘her great Indian Empire’ (‘sein großes ostindisches Reich’) (List 1909a List, F. 
(1909a), The National System of Political Economy (London: Longmans).: 42, 51, 59, 73, 82). 
 
32. Here List once more foreshadowed Marx and Engels (1978 Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1978), ‘Manifesto of the 
Communist Party’, in R. Tucker (ed.), Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton), pp. 469–500.: 477), who would 
attribute the economic penetration of Asia to mass-produced, cheap European commodities that ‘batter down 
all Chinese walls'. 
 
33. List's consistent referral to colonial populations as ‘peoples’ rather than ‘nations’ would appear not to be 
accidental. The idea that backward colonial populations would attain national consciousness thanks to the 
political tutelage of advanced nations was the backbone of nineteenth-century liberal imperialism. 
 
34. According to Clark (2011 Clark, I. (2011), ‘Singular Hegemony: Pax Britannica 1815–1914’, in I. Clark (ed.), 
Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 98–122.: 114), a paradoxical source of 
instability of nineteenth-century British hegemony was that Britain's capacity to lead its European contenders by 
the force of example also proved to be the primary push behind the race to colonisation and militarisation. 
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35. In 1846, List penned a memorandum addressed by British Prime minister Sir Robert Peel, proposing an 
Anglo-German alliance against the inevitable economic ascendancy of the USA and the aggressive foreign policy 
of Russia (see Henderson 1989b Henderson, W.O. (1989b), ‘Friedrich List and England’, in W.O. Henderson (ed.), 
Marx, Engels, and the English Workers, and Other Essays (London: Frank Cass), pp. 117–34.: 124–5). 
 
36. Once again, the USA provided List with the resources with which to build projections of a federated Europe 
and even a federated world in which capital, commodities and labour would flow freely (List 1909a List, F. 
(1909a), The National System of Political Economy (London: Longmans).: 103). 
 
37. List's vision of a World Trade Congress can be interpreted as prefiguring the Mandate System of the interwar 
period that juridified the nineteenth-century colonial discourse of the civilising mission by instituting the ‘dual 
mandate’ of promoting economic development and material welfare in mandate territories (see Anghie 2005 
Anghie, A. (2005), Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)., Rist 2008 Rist, G. (2008), The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith 
(London: Zed Books).). 
 
38. Without accounting for the emancipatory promise of Listian ideas, we cannot explain their appeal to many 
nineteenth-century developmental projects on the periphery of Europe, where ‘Adam Smith was regarded as 
the equal of Friedrich List – where authors such as Carey, Hamilton or St. Simon … were believed to provide 
superior guidance on the path to growth, than Mill and Marshall’ (Psalidopoulos and Mata 2002 Psalidopoulos, 
M. and Mata, M.E. (2002), ‘Economic Thought and Policy in Nineteenth-Century Less Developed Europe: Issues 
and Aspects of Their Interaction’, in M. Psalidopoulos and M. E. Mata (eds), Economic Thought and Policy in Less 
Developed Europe: The Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge), pp. 1–20.: 6). 
 
39. List's influence permeated the economically and politically peripheral countries of Europe at the same time it 
extended to extra-European contexts. In the hundred years following its publication, the National System was 
translated into a dozen European languages. Even in countries where it circulated only in its German original, 
like the late-Ottoman Empire and post-Ottoman Turkey, it left a significant intellectual impact, especially 
amongst the modernising elites (Todd 2015 Todd, D. (2015), Free Trade and Its Enemies in France, 1814–1851 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).: 153). 
 
40. This is more than an imagistic analogy. The radical swadeshi activist Radhakamal Mukherjee did extend the 
critique of colonial division of labour to the town-country division within the nation-state and argued that ‘skill, 
enterprise, knowledge, and wealth’ drained from the village to the city (Goswami 2004 Goswami, M. (2004), 
Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).: 239). 
28 
 
 
41. It is suggestive that some of the European countries criticised for their lack of competitiveness today, like 
Spain, Portugal and Italy, were included by List amongst those backward and ‘barbarous’ regions that would 
benefit from the civilising impact of free trade with the advanced countries (List 1983 List, F. (1983), The Natural 
System of Political Economy (London: Frank Cass).: 50). 
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